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Courts and Sovereigns in the Pari Passu Goldmines
Anna Gelpern1

Introduction
This article revisits a once-notorious case brought by a Swedish holder of defaulted German bonds,
decided by the highest federal court in Switzerland in 1936.2 Like another notorious case,
prompted by Argentina’s default and decided in New York between 2011 and 2014,3 it considered
a sovereign debtor’s promise to rank its creditors pari passu (“on equal footing”). Swiss and U.S.
courts both read this contract term to require the sovereign to make proportional payments to its
creditors. Nonetheless, Germany’s creditors lost, while Argentina faced a worldwide financial
boycott ordered by U.S. courts in the name of equal treatment.4
Courts and advocates in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, among others, have
operated on the assumption that no court had considered the meaning of pari passu in sovereign
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Judgment given on April 20th, 1935, by the Civil Court of the Canton of Basel-Stadt in re Claim for Compensation
of a Swedish Holder of Young Loan Bonds against the Trustee on Account of Alleged Wrong Distribution of
Available Loan Moneys (hereinafter, “AB Obligationsinteressenter Trial Court Judgment”); Aktiebolaget
Obligationsinteressenter, Stockholm v. The Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Judgment given on November
29, 1935, by the Court of Appeal of the Canton of Basel-Stadt (hereinafter “AB Obligationsinteressenter Appeals
Court Judgment”); Aktiebolaget Obligationsinteressenter, Stockholm v. The Bank for International Settlements,
Basel, Judgment given on May 26th, 1936, by the Swiss Federal Court (hereinafter, “AB Obligationsinteressenter
Federal Court Judgment”). All three decisions as translated and with Note by the Secretariat, Committee for the
Study of International Loan Contracts, League of Nations, Geneva, February 11th, 1937. League of Nations Archives
Registry Files, Box R 4609, Registry No. 10C:23448.
3

See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Capital Ltd. V. Republic of
Argentina, 723 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (cert.
denied). The appeals considered injunctions issued by the U.S. Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York. See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 08-cv-06978(TPG), 09-cv-1707(TPG), 09-cv1708(TPG), 2012 WL 5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (“NML Injunction”).
4

See Mark Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 31 Yale J. on Reg. 189 (2014);
BBC News, Argentina Defaults for the Second Time, July 31, 2014, at http://www.bbc.com/news/business28578179; Matt Levine, Now Argentina Can't Even Pay Bonds in Argentina, Bloomberg View, March 13, 2015, at
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-13/now-argentina-can-t-even-pay-bonds-in-argentina.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817693

Draft

February 2016 (v. 7b)

debt before 2000.5 The Swiss interpretation, tangled up in the financial and economic wreckage of
World War I and the collapse of the gold standard, has gone unremarked in the huge scholarly
literature on the pari passu clause6—even though it resurfaced in 1980 as part of a high-profile
dispute involving the same clause in the same bonds, which had been restructured after World War
II.7 This article reviews the opinions from the 1930s and 1980, and explores their implications for
today’s contracts.
To the extent they paid attention to the pari passu clause in sovereign debt, U.S. and U.K. writers
and practitioners at the turn of the 21st century read it as a promise of equal ranking, which
emphatically did not require the debtor to make pro rata payments to its creditors.8 A Belgian
court decision in 2000 advancing the payment interpretation was called “rogue”; similar U.S. court
rulings since 2011 have been derided as so historically and functionally unmoored as to threaten
New York’s position as a global financial center.9

5

See e.g., Declaration of Lord Nicholas Phillips, K.G., P.C., in Red Pines LLC et al. v. Republic of Argentina, Case
No. 14-cv-09427 (TPG) §23 ("Remarkably, until the decision of the Belgian court of Appeal in the case of Elliot
Associates L.P. v Banco de la Nacion 2000 WL 1449862, it does not appear that any court anywhere in the world
had ruled on the meaning of the Pari Passu Clause in the context of sovereign debt.”)
6

This literature includes dozens of articles on the pari passu clause, a book, and an entire volume of this Journal
devoted to its history in sovereign debt. See, MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013); CAP. MKTS L.J. VOL. 9:3, (Jeffrey
Golden & Lachlan Burn eds., 2014). See e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in
Sovereign Debt, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004); William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational
Choices 53 EMORY L. J. 823 (2004); Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 THE BUSINESS
LAWYER 635-651 (2001); Mark Weidemaier et. al., Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013); Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 Emory
L. J. 1120 (2006); Robert A. Cohen, “Sometimes a Cigar is Just a Cigar": The Simple Story of Pari
Passu. 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2011); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77
(2011); Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Understanding the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: A
Complex Quest, 43 INT’L LAW. 1217 (2009); Umakanth Varottil, Sovereign Debt Documentation: Unraveling the
Pari Passu Mystery, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 119 (2008); Natalie A Turchi, Note, Restructuring a Sovereign
Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment? 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2171
(2015).
“The Question whether the re-evaluation of the German Mark in 1961 and 1969 constitutes a case for application
of the clause in article 2 (e) of Annex I A of the 1953 Agreement on German External Debts,” May 19, 1980, United
Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XIX pp. 67-145 (2006) (hereinafter, “Young Loan/London
Agreement Arbitration”).
7
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See e.g., GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 6 (interview reports and literature review); Buchheit & Pam, supra note 6,
Gulati & Klee, supra note 6.
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See e.g., Gelpern, supra note 6 at n. 59 (citing an industry association position paper that called the Belgian
decision “rogue”); Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of
Argentina’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) at 5
(arguing that “the decision could harm U.S. interests in promoting issuers’ use of New York law and preserving
New York as a global financial jurisdiction”).
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Yet decades earlier, three Swiss courts—the trial court in the Basel canton, the canton appellate
court and the supreme federal court—all read a pari passu clause in German bonds as a promise
of ratable payment. The intermediate appeals court even described a plausible enforcement
strategy through lawsuits by bondholders against one another. At no point did any of the Swiss
judges or expert commentators on AB Obligationsinteressenter v. Bank for International
Settlements (hereinafter, AB Obligationsinteressenter) suggest that the meaning of pari passu was
ambiguous, or that a meaning other than ratable payment was conceivable. The same German
bonds were the subject of an international arbitration between 1971 and 1980, where creditors
again claimed discrimination in breach of the pari passu clause. The arbitral ruling cited to the
Swiss case in its discussion of pari passu, but seems to support a mix of ranking and ratable
payment interpretation.
A lost judicial reading of an improbably famous, recently litigated clause is an exciting discovery.
Yet without more, it would be of little interest outside the circle of pari passu enthusiasts.
Especially now that Argentina’s new government tries to settle the last of the lawsuits from its
2001 debt default, why should anyone bother with ancient history—or “contract paleontology”? 10
Exhuming AB Obligationsinteressenter and its aftermath prompts four uncomfortable questions
about the uses of history in financial contract interpretation and sovereign debt enforcement:






First, should a 1936 Swiss reading of a 1930 contract carry any weight with U.S. courts in
2016? While not formally binding, the old decision might be persuasive if it revealed a
general market understanding of the clause, which could or should be attributed to
contracting parties decades later. The 1980 arbitral ruling is less distant—but more
ambivalent about the meaning of pari passu.
Second, does the experience with interpreting German bond contracts argue against trying
to construe pari passu in contemporary sovereign debt? The old decisions discussed the
meaning of the clause, but would not enforce it. Recent injunctions cast doubt on whether
any reading of the pari passu clause should be a vehicle for sovereign debt enforcement.
Where interpretation leads to feckless or damaging remedies, abstention might be wise.
Third, has the pari passu obsession distracted commentators from more pressing and
tractable problems in sovereign debt? Germany’s interwar default and its aftermath confirm
the centrality of trustees, payment and clearing systems for sovereign debt. Market
institutions have also figured in recent lawsuits, but have drawn far less academic
commentary than the meaning of pari passu. Scholarly inattention is costly: courts seem
to have chronic trouble dealing with market infrastructure in sovereign debt.

10

On settlement negotiations at this writing, see Rule 62.1 Indicative Ruling, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, No. 14-cv-8630 (TPG) (Feb. 19, 2016) (hereinafter, “Indicative Ruling”). On “contract paleontology,”
studying drafting and usage history for contemporary contract interpretation, see Lee C. Buchheit, A Note on
Contract Paleontology, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 251 (2014).
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Fourth, are sovereign debt contracts really up to the contracting parties? Attempts to
enforce sovereign bonds in the 1930s and 2000s both triggered concerted international
policy responses to blunt the impact of judicial rulings. Whether a given policy response
makes sense is for another day; the take-away here is only that sovereign debt contracts,
perhaps more than others, live in its shadow.

This project came about by accident, when I stumbled on translations of AB
Obligationsinteressenter in the archives of the League of Nations Committee for the Study of
International Loan Contracts (hereinafter, the “League Committee”) in Geneva, while researching
policy-driven contract reform.11 I do not aim to provide a definitive treatment of the case here;
instead, I use its reception by the League committee to illuminate recurring challenges facing
courts and international policy makers in sovereign debt crises. The treatment of the 1980 decision
in the Young Loan/London Agreement arbitration is similarly confined to its implications for the
pari passu case study, where it serves as a link between the German and Argentine default
episodes, and helps extract lessons for interpretation.
After summarizing the contemporary pari passu debate in Part I and introducing the German
interwar debt controversy in Part II, I devote the bulk of the article to a detailed account of the
Swiss decisions. Part III reviews the Swedish lawsuit, the Swiss court opinions and expert
reactions, drawn from the League Committee archives, practitioner and academic commentary.
Part IV is devoted to the 1980 arbitral decision, while Part V discusses implications for the courts
and contract drafters today.
My conclusions are necessarily preliminary, pending further investigation in BIS and national
archives, and in-depth consideration of the Swiss legal context, among others. Nonetheless,
continuing turmoil in sovereign debt markets at the start of 2016, coupled with the market and
policy fallout from attempts to enforce Argentina’s debt, all argue for sharing the preliminary
evidence sooner rather than later.

I.

Pari Passu Who?

For the jilted creditor of a sovereign, the pari passu clause has turned into the most promising
collection weapon to come along since 19th century gunboats. Its apparently simple pledge of intercreditor equality has made the world’s most powerful politicians and bankers squirm. Early in the
21st century, claims of pari passu violation made Peru and Congo pay a king’s ransom to a few
11

See e.g., Mark Weidemaier et al., When Governments Write Contracts: Policy and Expertise in Sovereign Debt
Markets in GRÉGOIRE MALLARD & JÉRÔME SGARD, EDS., CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: A HUNDRED YEARS OF
LEGAL EXPERIMENTATION IN GLOBAL MARKETS (forthcoming 2016).
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creditors for the privilege of paying a pittance to the rest; in 2014, it made Argentina default on
$28 billion in restructured bonds. Yet it is far from clear that the pari passu undertaking, which
has accompanied sovereign bonds since at least the mid-19th century,12 was ever meant to be a
collection tool at all, let alone the creditors’ best hope.
The quest for the true meaning of pari passu in sovereign debt contracts has driven countless deep
thinkers to distraction.13 To this day, there are more definitive accounts of what it does not mean
than what it does. For example, according to the Encyclopedia of Banking Law,
[T]he pari passu clause has nothing to do with the time of payment of unsecured indebtedness,
since this depends upon contractual maturities. … It is suggested that a pari passu clause in
state credit is primarily intended to prevent the legislative ear-marking of revenues of the
government, or the legislative allocation of inadequate foreign currency reserves to a single
creditor and is generally directed against legal measures which have the effect of preferring
one set of creditors over the others or discriminating between creditors at a time when the state
is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.14
With very few notable exceptions,15 most academic and professional treatments of the clause
published since the 1990s shared the Encyclopedia view: “rank pari passu” could not possibly
mean “pay pari passu.”16
Scholars typically put the rise of pari passu as a sovereign debt enforcement tool to a 2000 Brussels
commercial court ruling, which blocked Peru from paying its restructured debt unless it paid its
defaulted debt in full.17 Holdout creditors, who had paid approximately $11 million for the debt,
got $56 million from Peru in a quick settlement, while other creditors had agreed to deep haircuts.
A similar Belgian court ruling against Nicaragua was later overturned on appeal since the
injunction had improperly targeted the Euroclear system.18 A handful of other lawsuits around the
world left the meaning and the legal effect of pari passu unresolved until 2013, when U.S. federal
courts held that Argentina’s pari passu clause forbade selective default—the debtor must either

12

Benjamin Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and his Black Eagle: The Origins of Pari Passu?, 9 CAP. MKTS L.J.
216 (2014).
13

Supra note 6.

14

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING LAW (2002).

15

See e.g., Bratton, supra note 6.

16

See e.g., Gulati & Klee, supra note 6; Buchheit & Pam, supra note 6.

17

Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26,
2000).
18

Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Investments LLC and Euroclear Bank SA, (Commercial Court of Brussels 2003).
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pay all its creditors in proportion to their current contract claim, or default on them all—and
promptly triggered comprehensive default when the government refused to settle.19
The U.S. rulings met with outrage in some quarters and jubilation in others. Critics accused the
courts of twisting the meaning of the clause. The governments of Brazil, France, Mexico, and the
United States filed briefs supporting the “ranking” view advanced by Argentina before the U.S.
Federal Courts.20 They too said that pari passu was designed to protect against legal subordination
(which hardly ever happened), not selective payment (which happened all the time). Other
commentators observed that even if ratable payment had been the goal, the court’s valuation was
inequitable: putting restructured and un-restructured claims on the same footing gave some
creditors a fraction of the original principal amount and others a big multiple.21 At the other
extreme, fans of the rulings said that the clause was meant precisely as a nuclear commitment
device for immune sovereign debtors, which could otherwise default and discriminate with
impunity. To give the creditors the benefit of their bargain, the court had to enforce equal treatment
in the broadest sense.22
Both sides were struggling with the same awkward problem: if the clause meant what they said,
pari passu was a contract version of the human appendix. It had no discernible function in the 21st
century, but threatened mass damage when inflamed.
History can help allay some of the awkwardness. It is comforting to know that once upon a time,
a distant author contracted for pari passu with the knowledge and specific intent lacking in today’s

19

Supra note 3. Argentina’s pari passu clause is reproduced in Appendix I.

20

Brief of the Federative Republic of Brazil as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, NML Capital v. Argentina,
727 F.3d 230 (No. 13-990); Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of
Argentina's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, NML Capital v. Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (No. 13-990); Brief of The
United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, NML Capital v. Argentina,
727 F.3d 230 (No. 13-990); Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, NML
Capital v. Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (No. 12-105-cv).
21

Mark L.J. Wright, Interpreting the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: It Is all Hebrew (and
Aramaic) to Me, CAPITAL MARKETS LAW JOURNAL (2014) 9 (3): 259-265. Some of the contracts had been reduced to
less than a third of the original value; others were a multiple of it thanks to accrued past-due interest.
See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 6 and Declaration of Lord Nicholas Phillips, supra note 5, for discussion of parties’
intent. The pari passu clause was easy to apply to firms, which could be liquidated in bankruptcy, with proceeds
distributed to creditors in order of priority. Creditors who ranked equally would naturally also be paid ratably. Pari
passu was harder to operationalize for sovereign debtors, which could not be liquidated. The rank of a claim might
be conferred by contract or statute before the debtor became insolvent, but determining the implications for
distribution is harder: there is no moment of insolvency and no bankruptcy estate; creditors are paid from revenues
as claims come due. Sovereign immunity complicates matters further because it makes formal subordination seem
inessential: the debtor might pay some of its creditors and stiff others for a long time before the stiffed obtain
meaningful remedies.
22
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users of his words.23 The idea of an accessible historical meaning also fits with institutional
explanations of contract boilerplate, where parties might reject bespoke language in favor of
widely used terms whose meaning is anchored in commercial usage, construed by the courts, or
both, but where vestigial phrases can also malinger long past their prime.24
History has its limits: while studying ancient clauses might help transactional lawyers make more
educated drafting choices today, it is much less likely to help judges ascertain modern-day drafters’
intent. On the other hand, historical evidence can successfully challenge a claim that a given term
can only one meaning. For instance, if contract drafters in the 1930s used pari passu as a promise
of ratable payment, it would be hard to argue in 2016 that such a meaning were logically
inconceivable.
Earlier excursions into pari passu’s origins have uncovered contract and statutory texts that, in the
political and economic context of the day, could variously support either payment or ranking
interpretations of the clause.25 This article adds adjudication to the mix. Judges and arbitrators can
put forward an authoritative meaning binding on the contracting parties, illuminate contemporary
usage, or elaborate the legal effect of the clause under different circumstances. Decisions prompted
by Germany’s interwar default on the Young Loan bonds did a bit of all three.

II.

Doomed Bonds

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was no ordinary bond trustee. Established in 1930
with subscriptions from leading European central banks and the active involvement of leading U.S.
financiers, it was both a bank and a policy institution. It tried to coordinate international monetary
and financial affairs amid a deepening depression, the demise of the gold standard, proliferating
capital controls, and viral banking crises.26 A key part of the BIS’s initial mandate was to
The “distant author” is a fixture in contracts. Unable to access the specific intent of actual parties or to discern the
meaning of a term from the text, a reader might look to history, custom, or trade association pronouncements. See
e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1149 (2006). For a broader discussion
of the distant author phenomenon in contract drafting and interpretation, see e.g., Lori D. Johnson, Say the Magic
Word: A Rhetorical Analysis of Contract Drafting Choices 65 Syracuse L. Rev. 451, 465 (2015) (considering the
implications of Michel Foucault’s discussion of contracts as authorless documents).
23

24

Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985); Symposium, Boilerplate: Foundations of Market
Contracts, Mich L. Rev. 821 (2006); GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 6.
25

Chabot & Gulati, supra note 12, Sung Hui Kim, Pari Passu: The Nazi Gambit, 9 Cap. Mkts. L.J. 242 (2014).
(payment); Buchheit & Pam, supra note 6 (ranking)
26

BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1919-1939 (1995);
GIANNI TONIOLO, CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION AT THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 1930-1973
(2005).
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administer a convoluted scheme whereby Germany borrowed foreign currency from international
bondholders to pay World War I reparations to the Allied powers in Europe, which in turn owed
money to the United States.
Germany had borrowed approximately $200 million in 1924 from foreign bondholders in U.S.
dollars, British pounds, Italian lire, Swedish kronor, and Swiss francs. The Dawes Plan Loan (as
the bond issue was called) had been part of a deal to resume reparations payments and help
stimulate the German economy. The Dawes bonds had priority claim on Germany’s foreign
exchange, and were secured by revenues, notably from tobacco and alcohol taxes. The U.S. dollar
tranche alone was indexed to gold, to protect it from currency depreciation. The Agent-General
for Reparations, U.S. banker Parker Gilbert, was charged with overseeing currency transfers to
minimize exchange rate disruptions; this gave him considerable power over German economic
management.27
Even as an interim settlement, the Dawes Plan soon proved to be both politically and economically
untenable. It was replaced in 1930 by the Young Plan, named after U.S. industrialist and diplomat
Owen D. Young. The new plan rescheduled reparations payments and provided for the withdrawal
of French troops from German territory. It also included a new international bond issue. The Young
Plan Loan raised approximately $300 million, with bonds denominated in French francs, U.S
dollars, British pounds, Swedish kronor, Dutch florins, Swiss francs, German reichsmarks, Italian
lire, and Belgian belgas.28 Two thirds of the proceeds went to pay reparations; the rest to the
German government for investment in railways and the postal service. In contrast to the Dawes
Loan bonds, the Young Loan bonds had no priority on foreign exchange transfers; however, all its
tranches were indexed to gold at their value on the date of issue. Germany was now responsible
for procuring the foreign exchange for external payments.29 The Young Loan bonds were partially
secured with railway tax revenues, and a second lien on the revenues already securing the Dawes
Loan bonds.30 The office of the Agent-General was eliminated, ceding economic policy authority
27

LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 207-08 (2009); Piet Clement,
‘The Touchstone of German Credit’: Nazi Germany and the Service of the Dawes and Young Loan, FINANCIAL
HISTORY REVIEW 11.1 (2004), pp. 33–50; EICHENGREEN, supra note 26. Chicago banker Charles G. Dawes, who
later became Vice-President under Calvin Coolidge, shared the 1925 Nobel Peace Prize with British Foreign
Secretary Austen Chamberlain for his role in negotiating the plan.
The listing is in the order of tranche sizes. One third of the loan represented “postponable annuities,” whose
repayment could be deferred under certain adverse conditions. For a contemporary discussion, see George P. Auld,
The Dawes and Young Loans: Then and Now, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1934).
28

29

See e.g., EICHENGREEN, supra note 26 at 245; BARRY EICHENGREEN, HALL OF MIRRORS: THE GREAT DEPRESSION,
THE GREAT RECESSION, AND THE USES—AND MISUSES—OF HISTORY (2015) at 434n21 (describing the bonds issued
under the Young Plan as subordinate to reparations obligations owing to their lack of transfer priority).
“As regards the two-thirds of the service monies which were provided out of the non-postponable annuities the
German Government constituted as collateral guarantee for the annuities a special tax payable by the German
Railway Company and undertook, subject to the charge securing the German External Loan 1924 [the Dawes Loan],
to reserve free from any charge securing any loan or credit in priority to, or pari passu with, the said annuities, the
30
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back to the German government. The BIS became Trustee for the Young Loan bonds and Fiscal
Agent for the Dawes Loan bonds.31
The BIS was envisioned as a neutral international organization that would distribute payments
from Germany in different currencies to the bondholders in different countries with an eye to
minimizing market disruptions and promoting policy coordination. Turning war reparations into a
commercial financing administered by a technocratic institution was meant to diffuse political
controversy around the plan, and to insulate politicians on all sides from the associated taint.32
Commercialization translated some of the national rivalries and mutual suspicions of the day into
the language of contract. The Young Loan bond terms use the phrase pari passu in five different
provisions, excerpted in Appendix II. The recitals and Paragraph XII reflect Germany’s promise
not to give any future creditors equal or better rights in the revenue pledge securing the Young
Loan bond. Paragraph II says that the bonds in the nine different currency tranches would be
payable to bearer, and would “rank pari passu irrespective of date or place of issue or otherwise.”
Paragraphs IX and XIV clarify that Germany may issue more bonds “ranking pari passu as to
payment with the Bonds of the present Loan.” Paragraph IX in particular refers to the application
of Germany’s periodic payments to the BIS among existing and future loans of equal rank. In all,
pari passu in the Young Loan referred to three kinds of equality: (1) equality among bondholders
of different issues with respect to revenues pledged as collateral, (2) equality among bondholders
of different issues with respect to periodic payment distribution, and (3) equality among
bondholders of the same issue. The last category did not refer to collateral or payments, but
expressed concern about discrimination based on currency and, implicitly, creditor nationality.
On the face of the document, it is hard to tell whether the reference to different debts ranking pari
passu with the Young Loan bonds could include debt outside the reparations financing
arrangement cleared through the BIS. At least two borrowings could fit this description, the first
of which was certainly contemplated by the parties to the Young Loan. In October 1929, Swedish
industrialist and financial schemer Ivar Kreuger agreed to lend the German government
approximately $125 million in parallel with the Young Loan, in exchange for a match monopoly.
A year later, Boston financial firm Lee, Higginson and Company arranged another $125 million

proceeds of the customs, the tobacco taxes, the beer tax and the tax on spirits.” Bank for International Settlements,
Fourth Annual Report, April 1, 1933-March 31, 1934, Basel, May 14, 1934 (Hereinafter, “BIS Fourth Annual
Report”), at 40.
31

Prominent U.S. and European financiers, including Gates McGarrah, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and the first Chairman of the BIS, served as trustees for the Dawes loan. The three men were
charged among other duties with overseeing the distribution of German revenues from collateral accounts. See note
68 infra.
32

Beth A. Simmons, Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements, 45 WORLD POLITICS 361
(1993); Thomas W Lamont, The Final Reparations Settlement, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 336 (1930).

9

Draft

February 2016 (v. 7b)

in shorter-term credits for the government.33 Swedish and U.S. creditor representatives later
demanded that these be paid pari passu with the Young Loan.34
The Young Plan fell apart almost as soon as it began. The failure of Austria’s Creditanstalt bank
in May of 1931 started a wave of panics and crashes across Europe. When German officials raised
the possibility of a moratorium on reparations, German banks suffered dramatic outflows. Shortly
after, U.S. President Herbert Hoover offered to suspend Allies’ debt payments to the United States
if they agreed to pause German reparations; the “Hoover Moratorium” went into effect later that
year. Another round of intergovernmental negotiations in Lausanne ended Germany’s reparations
obligations in 1932, but specifically preserved the rights of private bondholders under the Dawes
and Young Loans.
Meanwhile, the gold standard was crumbling. Britain and Sweden went off the gold standard in
the fall of 1931; their currencies soon fell by 40 percent. The United States followed suit in April
of 1933; in June, the Congress passed a Joint Resolution declaring gold indexation clauses
unenforceable.35 Germany imposed exchange controls to stem the loss of reserves, but continued
to peg the reichsmark to gold. It stuck to the peg even as the falling currencies of its trading partners
made its exports uncompetitive, and made it impossible to generate enough foreign exchange to
service its debts.

On Kreuger’s quest for match monopolies and his financing for Germany, see FRANK PARTNOY, THE MATCH
KING: IVAN KREUGER, THE FINANCIAL GENIUS BEHIND A CENTURY OF WALL STREET SCANDALS (1999). In addition
to the $125 million “Match Loan,” Kreuger also took up about half of the $20 million Swedish Young Loan tranche
himself, with another quarter for his firm, Kreuger & Toll. WILLIAM H. STONEMAN, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF IVAR
KREUGER 204 (1932, reprinted by Forgotten Books, London, 2013); TONIOLO, supra note 26 at 507 (n. 59, reporting
Kreuger’s stake at $15 million). Scholars have pointed to Kreuger’s financial dealings as the principal factor behind
the weakness of the Swedish banking system and Sweden’s financial crisis in 1931. Peter Kugler, Tobias
Straumann, and Florian Weber, How the German Crisis of 1931 Spread Across Europe: Evidence from the Swedish
Twin Crisis (mimeo, July 2013) 20-22, 37 at http://www.ehes.org/STRAUMANN%20et%20al.pdf (also
forthcoming in Economic History Review 2016).
33

On the two-year Lee, Higginson Loan, see EDWARD W. BENNETT, GERMANY AND THE DIPLOMACY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS, 1931 (1962) at 17-21 and 101 (n. 32). Kreuger had ties with Lee, Higginson and also participated
in the Lee, Higginson Loan to Germany. Id.
34

For example, the Swedish representative at a meeting called to address foreign exchange transfer disruptions and
held in Basel in April of 1934, insisted, “As fully laid down in a special memorandum of June 4, 1933, the Kreuger
loan is in all respects equal to the Young loan, with which it ranks pari passu. It ought, therefore, to receive the same
treatment as this latter loan not to speak of the Lee Higginson credit.” Statement of Mr. P. Brundell of
Skandinaviska Aktieblolaget, April 9, 1934, attached to Report of Pierre Jay, Laird Bell and W.W. Cumberland on
the German Long and Medium Term Debt Conference of April-May 1934 (June 25, 1934), pp. 14-15, 87. Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council (FBPC) Archives, Call No. M1287, Box 63. See also TONIOLO, supra note 26 at
153 and 531 (n. 199).
35

H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong. (1933); see Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
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Law, economics, and politics all played a part in Germany’s choice. The Young Plan agreement
required it to keep the reichsmark convertible into gold at fixed value.36 Treaties aside, devaluing
would have increased the cost of servicing foreign-currency debt, including the large short-term
debts owed by German financial institutions to foreign private creditors.37 The experience of
hyperinflation in the 1920s further made going off the gold standard politically unpalatable. Both
Hitler and Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht had publicly committed to maintain the
reichsmark’s value.38
Germany continued to pay the BIS the gold value of all the Young Loan coupons through 1932,
including those due to the British and Swedish bondholders. Several events at the start of 1933
might have contributed to a change in course. Hitler became Chancellor in January, and secured
extraordinary powers in March. The Nazi party had long targeted the Dawes and Young Plan
payments as symbols of Germany’s postwar humiliation.39 On the other hand, U.S. legislation and
English court decisions (later reversed) barring gold value payments40 gave Germany a new legal
argument. The BIS Annual Report for 1934 described the unraveling:
On May 10, 1933, however, the United States dollar having also left the gold standard, the
Finance Minister of the German Reich informed the Trustee that in view of the decisions
of certain English courts to the effect that the interest and principal of bonds expressed in
sterling and containing a gold clause are nevertheless payable in current legal tender
sterling, in the nominal amount of the coupon or bond, and having regard, also, to the fact
that the Government of the United States of America had taken the position that obligations
expressed in dollars and containing a gold clause were payable at their nominal value in
current legal tender without regard to such clause, it was the intention to effect future
payments in respect of the American, British and Swedish issues of the German
Government International 5 ½ % Loan 1930 in current legal tender dollars, sterling and

36

Debt Certificate of the German Reich, Sec. II.5, Annex III to the Agreement Regarding the Complete and Final
Settlement of the Question of Reparations from Germany (The Hague, January 20, 1930, in force generally May 17,
1930)
37

ADAM TOOZE, THE WAGES OF DESTRUCTION (2006), at 76; TONIOLO, supra note 26 at 127; KENNETH A. OYE,
ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AND POLITICAL EXCHANGE: WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1930S AND 1980S
(1992) at 114 (observing the predominance of British banks among the private debt holders).
38

TOOZE, supra note 37 at 113-114.

39

AHAMED, supra note 27.

The Court of King’s Bench and the Court of Appeal held in Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Belge d’Electricite (1
Ch. 684 (1933)) that a promise to pay in gold coin did not imply a promise to pay gold value in currency when
payment in gold was against public policy. The House of Lords reversed the following year (A.C. 161 (1933)). The
case is discussed in Arthur Nussbaum, Comparative and International Aspects of American Gold Clause
Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53, 56-57 (1934) and in Contracts. Gold Clause, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 560-62 (1934).
40
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crowns, respectively, in amounts sufficient to pay coupons and to meet the sinking fund
obligations at the respective nominal amounts, only.41
The trustee was in a bind. The BIS could either do as Germany said and discriminate among
bondholders from different countries, or pool the money and distribute it among all the tranches
in proportion to their claims on a gold value basis. As the BIS saw it, neither option complied with
the bond terms. Germany’s bond contract committed it to rank all the different currency tranches
“pari passu in all respects irrespective of date or place of issue or otherwise.”42 Simply transmitting
the money as instructed would give the U.S., U.K. and Swedish bondholders 40 percent less than
the others, measured by gold value. On the other hand, the gold clause in the general bond required
Germany to pay principal and interest at the gold value of the currency of denomination at the time
of issue, “but not less than the nominal amount of the principal and interest specified in each
Bond.”43 Pooling and redistributing the funds proportionately would result in payment below
nominal and gold value for the French, whose franc was still tied to gold, but above nominal and
below gold value for the Swedes, now off gold. The BIS chose to pass on the discriminatory
payments under protest:
After taking legal advice the Trustee decided that it was necessary, under the
circumstances, while reserving the rights to the unpaid amount computed on a gold value
basis, at least to pay the coupons of all issues of the Loan at their respective nominal
amounts… Certain paying agents have expressed dissatisfaction … taking the position that
the aggregate service should have been pooled, and divided pro rata on a gold value basis.
They have indicated that a competent judicial ruling might be sought.44
And so it was.

III.

An Awkward Case

Among the three aggrieved tranches, the Swedish one appears to have been the only one to sue.45
The United States vigorously and fruitlessly protested the plight of its bondholders through
41

BIS Fourth Annual Report, April 1, 1933-March 31, 1934 (May 14, 1934), supra note 30 at 40.

42

German Government International 5 ½ Per Cent. Loan 1930, §II (reproduced in Appendix II).

43

Id., §VI(a). Payment currency did not alter the valuation, which was based on the currency of denomination.

44

BIS Fourth Annual Report, supra note 30 at 41.

45

The plaintiff appears to be an investment vehicle established by members of the Wallenberg family (Marcus and
his sons Jacob and Marcus Jr.) on March 3, 1931. Its purpose, according to the corporate records, was “[t]o purchase
manage and sell deposits and foreign bonds and other comparable value documents and other related operations.”
(An electronic search for “Aktiebolaget Obligationsinteressenter” at Riksarkivet.se (Swedish national archives)
yielded one entry in the Records for Incorporated Companies 1901-1935 under the name AB ObligationsInteressenter.)
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diplomatic and banking channels;46 on the other hand, both the United Kingdom and Sweden
eventually concluded bilateral clearing agreements with Germany, taking advantage of their trade
surpluses with the recalcitrant debtor to recoup the bond payments.47
A. The Trial
AB Obligationsinteressenter sued the BIS in the Basel-Stadt canton civil court, where the BIS was
located.48 As a first order of business, the court struggled with the choice of law, which had not
been specified in the General Bond conditions. The BIS apparently argued that “Anglo-Saxon”
law should apply, because U.S. and U.K. tranches accounted for half of the total Young Loan,
because of the preeminence of U.S. and British bankers in arranging the loan, but also because the
case required the court to determine its duties as trustee, a concept that had no ready equivalent in
continental European law or practice.49 After concluding that none of these factors required
recourse to English law and observing that neither side argued for Swedish law, the court

The Wallenbergs were prominent Swedish bankers and industrialists, who were also active in international business
and diplomatic circles. They took over a substantial portion of the assets of the disgraced “Match King” Ivar
Kreuger after his suicide in 1932. It is possible that the Wallenbergs ended up owning most of Sweden’s Young
Loan bonds as a result of Kreuger’s death.
It is curious that a Wallenberg firm would be the only one to sue. Marcus Wallenberg, Sr. sat on the three-man
arbitration committee with jurisdiction over disputes concerning the maintenance of short-term private credits to
German banks. TONIOLO, supra note 26 at 127. After Germany started withholding foreign exchange for its debt
payments, Jacob Wallenberg was part of the Swedish delegation negotiating transfers, and later annual bilateral
clearing arrangements with Germany. John Foster Dulles’s 1933 reports to FBPC contain several references to
Wallenberg’s interventions, the most vocal of which concerned the imperative of preserving equal status for the
Kreuger Match Loan. At $125 million, it probably represented the largest single Swedish exposure. Memorandum of
Proceedings of the German Long-Term Debt Conferences, Held at the Reichsbank, December 5, 1933, p. 8, and
December 6, 1933, p. 12. FBPC Archives, Call No. M1287, Box 63. See also Sven-Olof Olsson, Nordic Trade
Cooperation in the 1930s, in MANAGING CRISES AND DE-GLOBALIZATION: NORDIC FOREIGN TRADE AND
EXCHANGE, 1919-1939 (2010), (Sven-Olof Olsson, ed.) at 25.
The lawsuit might have been a way for creditors from a relatively small and over-exposed country to gain leverage
in a multilateral negotiation. On the other hand, bringing a lawsuit might have antagonized German officials and
complicated Sweden’s negotiating efforts.
46

Kim, supra note 25.

47

Auld, supra note 28; Clement, supra at 27.

48

The plaintiffs might have thought that suing Germany was pointless in light of the absolute sovereign immunity
doctrine of the day; it also might have been politically wiser to sue the trustee rather than pick a fight with Hitler.
49

LUC THEVENOZ, TRUSTS IN SWITZERLAND: RATIFICATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON TRUSTS AND
CODIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY TRANSFERS 179 (2001) (dating the earliest decision to 1874); FELIX WEISER, TRUSTS
ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW (1936).
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proceeded to apply Swiss law as the law of the place of performance. 50 As predicted by the BIS,
this led to some awkward reasoning on the question of trust.
The plaintiff argued that the BIS violated its obligations as trustee when it paid them in nominal
money contrary to the gold and pari passu clauses in the general bond. The case turned on the
scope of the BIS’s duties—whether, as trustee, it “had not only the duty to pass on the payments
to the bondholders but had the additional obligation of ensuring in all circumstances payment to
the bondholders on the basis of equality, irrespective of the attitude adopted by the debtor.”
The canton trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove such “additional obligation” in
two steps. First, it pointed out that the German position on differential payment did not arise out
of financial difficulties, nor because the debtor “wished to favor” some bondholders over others,
but rather because it challenged the validity of the gold clause in the three tranches in question.
Overriding German instructions would have required an independent decision by the BIS as to the
validity of the gold clause. Second, the court decided that the BIS’s duties were “not those of an
arbitrator but of a paying agent,” a mostly-passive payment conduit. In light of the complexity of
the loan, “having its origin in political events,” the court assumed that BIS “did not intend to
contract any such far-reaching obligation as is implied by the contention of the plaintiff.” 51 The
court thus re-attached political roots to Germany’s “commercialized” debt, and used the BIS’s
political origins to turn it from “representative of the bondholders” into “paying agent” of the
debtor. With that, the court easily absolved the BIS of all liability under both the gold and pari
passu clauses.
Along the way the trial court made important observations about the meaning and consequences
of a pari passu undertaking. First, the judges found it uncontroversial that, “if the German Reich
had made a partial payment, for the sole reason that it had difficulties in raising the necessary
amounts, it might have been incumbent upon the defendant to employ the said payment only in
such a way as to take into account the gold clause and the pari passu clause, that is to say, only for
the uniform partial payment of all bondholders according to the gold value of their claims.”52
In other words, under different circumstances, the clause could be enforced as a promise of ratable
payment, and could bind third parties, such as trustees.53 Yet the court also held that the trustee in
this case—a passive conduit—could not deprive the sovereign debtor “of the practical possibility
50

AB Obligationsinteressenter Trial Court Judgment, supra note 2.

51

Id. at 4-5.

52

Id. at 3.

53

The court seemed to envision a situation where Germany would send a lump sum, short of the total owed, to the
BIS with no instructions as to its distribution. Separately, it observed that the case might have come out differently
“if the bondholders also had a claim to equal treatment inter se – a contention which has not been made.” Id. at 4.
The canton appellate court addressed inter-creditor liability in dicta.

14

Draft

February 2016 (v. 7b)

… of departing … vis-à-vis a section of the bondholders, from the agreements concluded.”54 Put
differently, it was Germany’s prerogative to discriminate in breach of its bond contract. As a
practical matter, the BIS (and, implicitly, the court) could do nothing about it.
B. First Appeal
The Court of Appeal for Basel-Stadt began by affirming the trial court’s application of Swiss law.55
The appeals court then focused on the BIS’s duties, analogizing to “the bailee holding a pledge …
the representative of creditors … and the testamentary executor.”56 While it did not use the term
“paying agent,” the court ruled that the BIS’s primary task was to move payments, and only “as
far as possible” to see to the performance of the bond terms. The court also saw “no reason” to
suppose that the BIS would, “particularly without special remuneration—… undertake a further
duty to make a decision as to the validity of the Reich’s attitude … not manifestly unjustified…”
(emphasis in the original).57
Moreover, by describing the Young Loan bonds as “independent claims against the Reich,” issued
in the form of “self-contained” bearer securities, the appeals court seemed to foreclose pooling and
redistribution by the trustee across tranches. This description created a limited opening for
payment discrimination: “the debtor who owes more than one debt may determine how his
payments are to be appropriated … if consistent with the basic contract.”
Thus if Germany had valid reasons to pay the French but not the Swedes, 58 it could. But even if
Germany were wrong, the BIS could not intervene at payment, since avoiding potential pari passu
breach against the Swedes would have certainly breached the gold clause against the French
(paying less than the nominal value of their coupon).59 The court thus validated the BIS’s decision
to follow instructions, rather than make an independent choice between the two violations.
Of the three opinions in AB Obligationsinteressenter, the Court of Appeals offered the most
elaborate reading of the pari passu clause in the Young Loan bonds, and possible remedies for its
breach:
The stipulation in the bonds that all issues ‘rank pari passu in all respects’ means primarily
that in the event of partial payments by the Reich, caused by diminished solvency, each
54

It noted tartly that “a uniform ‘Anglo-Saxon’ law, such as the defendant endeavors to invoke, does not exist.” Id.

55

AB Obligationsinteressenter Appeals Court Judgment, supra note 2, at 6.

56

Id. at 7.

57

Id. at 8.

58

For example, if it were excused by supervening legislation abrogating gold indexation.

59

AB Obligationsinteressenter Appeals Court Judgment, supra note 2, at 7-8.

15

Draft

February 2016 (v. 7b)

bond is entitled to an equal share and no issues can claim to be in a privileged class …
Such a right would be conceivable as a reciprocal claim between the bondholders, or as a
claim of the bondholders against the Reich…60
“Rank pari passu” according to this court meant that, if Germany had been short on funds, it would
have had to pay all the Young Loan creditors ratably. Moreover, bondholders could sue one
another to recover disproportionate payment, although the lower court reported that no reciprocal
claims had been brought. Had the Swedish creditors successfully sued Germany (presumably
shielded by immunity) or the French and Dutch bondholders, then the BIS could ignore Germany’s
distribution instructions. However, the BIS could intervene on its own only if Germany sought to
discriminate on “manifestly untenable grounds” (emphasis in the original), for example, cutting
off creditors from countries “hostile to Germany.”61 Like the trial court, the canton court of appeal
held that the Young Loan trustee fulfilled its duties by making feckless protests while doing as it
was told by Germany.
C. Second Appeal
On its second and final appeal, AB Obligationsinteressenter argued before the highest federal court
in Switzerland that the lower courts had (i) misconstrued the concept of trust under the Young
Loan agreements, (ii) wrongly held that the bonds represented independent claims against
Germany, (iii) misapplied the “manifestly unfounded”62 standard, discussed above, to Germany’s
gold clause repudiation, (iv) wrongly concluded that the BIS could and did interpret the bond
contracts in good faith, and (v) wrongly assumed that the BIS was not compensated for considering
the validity of Germany’s gold clause claims.63 The BIS, well-served by Swiss law so far,
meanwhile had “rightly abandoned” its claim to “Anglo-Saxon” governing law.64
The federal court’s holding was anticlimactic. Like the two canton courts, it held that the
bondholders stood in direct contractual relationship to the German Reich, and that the BIS was a
“mere intermediary between creditor and debtor,” obliged to carry out Germany’s instructions
unless they were “manifestly untenable”65—and upheld the appellate court judgment.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 8.

62

AB Obligationsinteressenter Federal Court Judgment, supra note 2. At least in the League of Nations translation,
the terms “manifestly unjustified,” “manifestly untenable,” and “manifestly unfounded” are used interchangeably.
63

Id. at 11.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 13.
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Although the court refused to apply the pari passu clause in the Young Loan bonds, it did spin out
counterfactual scenarios where the clause would come into play. For example, had Germany owed
a single global debt to the BIS, with creditors holding claims against the BIS, “the so-called pari
passu clause, on which the plaintiff relies, could only represent an obligation of the defendant
[BIS],” and discrimination “would be out of the question.”66 In contrast, on the facts of this case
“the pari passu clause, like the gold clause, represent[ed] a contractual obligation of the Reich...,”
and did not bind the BIS directly. The BIS was thus bound to follow Germany’s payment
instructions even if they were “indisputably” in breach of the pari passu clause:
[T]he reasons given by the German Reich for its course of action—which, it must be
conceded, indisputably infringed both the gold clause and the pari passu clause—show that
this measure was intended as a reprisal devised from the point of view of international law
against those States which for their part had gone off the gold standard and which,
disregarding obligations provided with gold clauses, had prejudiced the interests of
nationals of the German Reich. It was not for the defendant to decide whether such a right
of reprisal appertained to the German Reich or whether the non-observance of the
provisions of the contract was impermissible even from the point of view of international
law. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision to that effect in the loan contract,
it cannot be assumed that there was any intention to grant the defendant so extensive
authority, far exceeding the functions of a paying agent and a representative of the
bondholders. It had to suffice for the defendant that the standpoint of the Reich was not
manifestly untenable.67
In other words, Germany had breached the pari passu clause to get back at the countries that went
off the gold standard and harmed its trade. Because this course of action could be characterized as
reprisals and excused under international law, the trustee could do nothing about it.
D. The Fallout
The Swiss courts were surely caught up in the complex political economy forces of the day. Hitler
was gaining power on the platform of repudiating what had been left of the post-war settlement.
The BIS embodied an effort to salvage the financial core of that settlement. By the time of the
Swedish lawsuit, reparations were dead, international clearing arrangements were fragmenting,
and the Dawes loan trustees had blocked German revenues to fierce protests from the Nazi

66

Id. at 12.

67

Id. at 13.
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authorities.68 Attempts to depoliticize reparations with private finance and technocratic expertise69
might have looked fanciful in retrospect.
An in-depth analysis of how all these forces affected the Swiss courts is far beyond the scope of
this article. The range of possible motives is relevant, however, for evaluating the courts’ reasoning
and the implications of the case today. The judges might have been wary of fueling political
conflict, simultaneously worried about antagonizing Germany, the Allied governments, and the
prominent financiers who did business with Swiss banks. They might have felt bound to protect
the BIS, a new international institution reluctantly entrusted to their jurisdiction: Switzerland was
a rising financial power that had beat out London in a diplomatic compromise that emphasized
neutrality and expertise.70 This case was a high-profile test of Swiss courts’ legal and financial
sophistication in construing complex Anglo-American-style contracts, as well as their ability to
navigate political landmines.
According to the cognoscenti, the judges failed miserably. The English barrister who wrote a 1937
memorandum for the League Committee, identifying “leading difficulties” in sovereign debt
practice, put the courts’ analysis in AB Obligationsinteressenter at the very top of his list, several
pages ahead of “inability to enforce securities” (states reneging on revenue pledges). He observed,
“It was hardly necessary to point out that the … decision is completely at variance with the whole
conception of trusteeship as understood in England.”71 A German expert on trusts, who was also
an English barrister, advanced similar criticisms, arguing that the opinions were symptomatic of a
broader failure by continental European lawyers to understand the common-law concept of trust.72
The League Committee experts generally agreed that the Swiss courts embarrassed themselves by

The trustees’ actions to freeze German revenues made headlines around the world in the summer of 1934. See
e.g., Dawes Loan. Germany’s Breach with Trustees, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Australia), July 18, 1934, p.
18, Dawes Trustees Protect Holders: German Revenues Withheld for Benefit of Foreign Bond Holders, THE
SPARTATANBURG HERALD (South Carolina), July 18, 1934, p. 10; German Money Tied Up: Trustees of Dawes
Loans in Move to Protect Payments; Trickery is Charged by Defiant Nazis, THE NEW LONDON DAY (Connecticut),
July 17, 1934, p. 1.
68

69

See Simmons, supra note 32 and Gates W. McGarrah, The First Six Months of the Bank for International
Settlements, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 14, No. 2, The Young Plan in Operation
(Jan., 1931), at 25-36.
The BIS’s location was heavily negotiated at its founding. Some of the negotiators felt strongly that the bank
should reside in London, a global financial center; however, Switzerland was chosen as a rising financial market and
a more neutral host. Basel made sense in part for its proximity to the borders of three countries, and good rail links.
TONIOLO, supra note 26 at 44; David J. Bederman, The Bank for International Settlements and the Debt Crisis, 6
BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 92, 98 (1988); Kugler et al., supra note 33 at 23.
71
Memorandum of A.P. Fachiri, League of Nations Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts,
Geneva, February 10, 1937(hereinafter, “Fachiri Memorandum”) at 6, League of Nations Archives Registry Files,
Box R 4609, Registry No. 10C:23448.
70

72

FELIX WEISER, supra note 49 (Weiser also sent reports and corresponded extensively with the secretariat for the
League Committee).
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conflating trustees with paying agents and concluding that the BIS had to follow German directions
in breach of the pari passu clause. Instead, they said, the proper course was for the BIS as trustee
to seek advice from the courts upon receiving an incomplete payment.
In light of this expert debate, the League Committee recommended in its final report that the
institution of bond trustee be specified more clearly in sovereigns’ contracts, along with governing
law. The report also suggested renaming the office of bond trustee, to avoid lulling creditors into
a false sense of security where the “trustee” had limited capacity (and perhaps limited incentives)
to protect them before national courts.73
A leading 20th century treatise on sovereign debt, published in 1951, devoted most of the chapter
on trustees to criticizing AB Obligationsinteressenter—fifteen years on, still the only definitive
judicial treatment of sovereign bond trustees on the European continent.74 The author, Yale law
professor Edwin Borchard, noted in passing that Germany’s payment scheme “was violative of the
pari passu as well as of the gold value clauses of the loan contract,”75 but otherwise focused on
criticizing the Swiss judges’ confusion of trustees and paying agents (citing League Committee
experts at length).
Despite the criticism, no one seriously suggested that the BIS should have redistributed the money
it got from Germany pro rata among the Young Loan tranches, or that another court would have
ordered it to do so. Borchard, in a footnote at the end of the chapter on trustees, cited the foremost
French jurist on the League Committee for the proposition that,
The practical result of the [Swiss] decision must be approved since the question whether
payment was due on a gold basis “really concerns the debtor and the bondholders” and
should not be left to a decision by the trustee.76
The quarrel then was all about the reasoning. In the eyes of the critics, the proper course of action
for the BIS was to seek a court ruling before making the payments, instead of waiting to be sued
after; however, by the time the trial court got the case, it was too late. In all likelihood, had the BIS
done what the critics suggested, a court following their recommendations would have endorsed
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League of Nations Report of the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts, Geneva 1939, at 15-20.

74

EDWIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 52 (1951). With just a whiff of faux
sadness, Borchard observed that “[t]hree successive Swiss courts labored with the proper solution of the question,
only to give evidence of the profound confusion created by the attempt to transplant the institution of the loan trust
in the unfavorable soil of Continental law.” Id.
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Id.

Id. at 62 n.58 (citing Jules Basdevant, who served on the League committee and was, at the time of Borchard’s
publication, President of the International Court of Justice).
76
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what the BIS did anyway. On the other hand, Anglo-American style bond trustees might have
taken root sooner in Europe.
The BIS and the Swiss judges must have known about the law and practice of seeking judicial
guidance for trustees in common law jurisdictions, but decided not to follow it. The trial court in
Basel explained its refusal to apply English law partly by highlighting “the impossibility of having
recourse, in cases of doubt, to a so-called court of equity, which might give the defendant [BIS]
guidance.”77 The BIS’s Annual Report says that it had sought legal advice after receiving
insufficient funds from Germany to pay the bondholders.78 Moreover, the difficulty of translating
the common-law concept of trust in civil law systems had been debated by elite commentators at
the time. In Switzerland, there had been a handful of published decisions grappling with the
problem long before the German default.79 As the gold standard and international clearing
arrangements fell apart in the early 1930s, bondholders filed lawsuits against trustees in several
countries, although AB Obligationsinteressenter appears to be the only reported case involving
sovereign bonds.80 Against this background, it is hard to believe that the Swiss courts were simply
ignorant. Rather, they might have elected to sacrifice analytical purity to reach the only politically
viable outcome—shielding the BIS from bondholders and politicians—while trying to reassure the
new bank that it did not need English law or the English courts to fulfil its mandate.

IV.

Epilogue—Interpretation Marches On

German debts were renegotiated after World War II, with the new terms set by the London
Agreement of 1953 that also effected unprecedented debt relief.81 Germany’s residual obligations
77

AB Obligationsinteressenter Trial Court Judgment, supra note 2 at 2.
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BIS FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 30 at 41. Given the prominence of English and U.S. financiers at the
founding of the BIS, and the BIS’s insistence on applying “Anglo-American law” at the first trial, it seems likely
that English lawyers were part of the decision-making process. See also BIS FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, APRIL 1, 1934MARCH 31, 1935 (May 13, 1935) at 59-60 (describing the payment disruptions, the bilateral clearing arrangements,
the initial lawsuit by “[a] bondholder” and the ruling in its favor by the trial court).
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See e.g., WEISER, supra note 49; THEVENOZ, supra note 49.

A 1937 League Committee memorandum noted that “[a]ctions have been brought by bondholders against one or
more of the Trustees in France, the United States, Switzerland, Belgium and Holland, claiming in each case that the
Trustee should have made payments on a gold basis out of the funds at their disposal.” Fachiri Memorandum, supra
note 71. According to Borchard, writing in 1951, AB Obligationsinteressenter was the only reported case against a
trustee for sovereign bonds. BORCHARD, supra note 74 at 60-61. An Austrian national holding a gold-indexed U.S.
dollar bond issued by the Austrian government in 1930 challenged a nominal dollar payment directly, suing the
government in an Austrian court in 1933. BIS FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 30 at 44. The case went up to
the highest court in Austria, where the government won in 1936. Commentators later debated whether the creditor
could next sue the trustee, to force ratable distribution among different tranches. Borchard, supra note 74 at 61.
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Among the restructured debts, the Young Loan was extended until 1980, and the Kreuger Match Loan until 1994.
The Lee, Higginson Loan, originally made for two years, would be replaced with a new two-year German
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to the Young Loan bondholders were no longer indexed to gold, but rather provided for a fixed
relationship among the currencies of denomination. In the event that any of the currencies declined
by more than five percent relative to another, the bondholders of the affected tranche would be
compensated by reference to the value of the stronger currencies.82 The agreement also contained
a broad prohibition on discrimination among bondholders.83
In 1971, Belgium, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States instituted
proceedings against Germany before the seven-person arbitral tribunal established under the
London Agreement. They argued that the two revaluations of the Deutschemark in the 1960s meant
that their currencies had lost value relative to the mark, giving their bondholders a right to
compensation under the agreement.84 The tribunal’s decision nearly a decade later construed the
government bond. Agreement on German External Debts, signed at London, February 27, 1953 (hereinafter, the
“London Agreement”), at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20333/volume-333-I-4764English.pdf. See generally, Richard M. Buxbaum, The London Debt Agreement of 1953 and Its Consequences, in
BALANCING OF INTERESTS, LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAY (Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne et al., eds.) (2005).
82

The Young Loan/London Agreement Arbitration, supra note 7. The exchange rate protection mechanism, found
in Annex I of the London Agreement, required Germany to index its payments to the value of “the least depreciated
currency,” measured by reference to the exchange rates in 1952:
Should the rates of exchange applying to any of the currencies mentioned in the text of this Bond on 1st
August, 1952, thereafter change to the extent of 5 per cent or more, the instalments due after that date,
while still being made in French Francs, shall be calculated on the basis of the least depreciated currency
(in relation to the rate of exchange current on lst August, 1952) reconverted into French Francs at the rate
of exchange current when the payment in question becomes due.
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The provision is reproduced in full below:
PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
The Federal Republic of Germany will not permit, nor will the creditor countries seek from the Federal
Republic of Germany, either in the fulfilment of terms of settlement in accordance with the present
Agreement and the Annexes thereto or otherwise, any discrimination or preferential treatment among the
different categories of debts or as regards the currencies in which debts are to be paid or in any other
respect. Differences in the treatment of different categories of debts resulting from settlement in accordance
with the provisions of the present Agreement and the Annexes thereto shall not be considered
discrimination or preferential treatment.

The London Agreement, Art. 8, supra note 81.
84
Young Loan/London Agreement Arbitration, supra note 7. See also, Joseph Gold, The Fund Agreement in the
Courts: XVI, IMF Staff Papers (1981) 28, 411–436, Camille Ann Bathurst, Note, Creditor Protection in a Changing
World—Case of Belgium (Belgium, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States v. Federal Republic of
Germany) (The Young Loan Arbitration), 15 TEX. INT’L L.J. 519 (1980). The case was brought as the prevailing
exchange rate system came under extreme stress, several months before the United States abandoned the link
between the dollar and the price of gold. This ended the post-war gold exchange standard, where the United States
had pegged to gold and other countries to the United States.
The arbitration is the subject of several articles, and is mentioned in at least one book that also discusses the pari
passu litigation against Peru. MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (2011). It also attracted some of the leading legal lights of the day, including Professor Francois
Gianviti, who later served as General Counsel of the International Monetary Fund during the pari passu enforcement
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exchange rate protection mechanism in the London Agreement against the background of
Germany’s general obligation not to discriminate among its creditors,85 and the same pari passu
clause in the Young Loan bonds that had been previously interpreted in AB
Obligationsinteressenter.
The complaining countries insisted that equality among creditors in different currency tranches
was central to the object and purpose of the London Agreement, preserved from the original Young
Loan.86 They argued that in economic terms, a rise in the Deutschemark was equivalent to a fall in
all other currencies relative to the Deutschemark, which should trigger the exchange rate protection
mechanism. Without it, payments on Deutschemark-denominated bonds would be worth more than
the rest, which would be tantamount to impermissible discrimination.
The panel split 4:3, in Germany’s favor. The majority held that exchange rate protection in the
agreement addressed devaluation but not revaluation, just like the 1930 gold clause, and that
payments consistent with this mechanism could not be prohibited discrimination. Along the way,
the tribunal considered the Young Loan pari passu clause:
[T]he prohibition of discrimination in Article 8 of the LDA [London Debt Agreement] in
the special context now before the Tribunal has no bearing beyond that of the pari passu
clause incorporated in Article II of the General Bond. This pari passu clause does not cover
the eventuality of "inequality in outcome", i.e. that of unequally high redemption payments.
The customary function of a pari passu clause in loan contracts is, in the interest of the
bondholders, to prevent the borrower from entering into new, additional obligations which
then rank before the bonded debt itself. The intention is to prevent, for example, a creditor
being put in a worse position in the servicing of loans than another with regard to the
amount paid, if the borrower is unable to meet all claims fully and uniformly at the same
time. [Internal citation omitted.]
The decisive purpose of a pari passu clause, therefore, is to guarantee a specific, an equal
ranking for loans furnished with such a clause. Article II of the General Bond accordingly
states-in the English text, which, according to Article III of the Bond, shall prevail-that the
different issues in the various currencies '' shall rank pari passu in all respects irrespective
of date or place of issue or otherwise". The article seeks to guarantee that, e.g., diminished
solvency or even temporary insolvency on the part of the borrower will affect each
bondholder to the same degree. In particular, the specific intention was to prevent the
litigation against Peru, Nicaragua, and Congo. Professor Gianviti was listed as assisting three teams—Belgium,
France, and Switzerland. Nonetheless, the treatment of the pari passu clause in the Young Loan/London Agreement
opinion is not part of the pari passu canon and is does not appear to have been mentioned in any of the leading
articles, briefs, or policy papers on the subject, which assume that the clause had not been interpreted by judges (or
arbitrators) before 2000.
85

The general anti-discrimination provision specifically carved out differential treatment permitted under the
London Agreement itself. London Agreement, Art. 8, supra note 83.
86

Bathurst, supra note 84 at 542.
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German Reich, in the event of difficulties with interest payments or redemption, from
making payment un-equally as between the various tranches, with the consequence that,
for example, bonds expressed in Italian lire or in Belgian francs could be paid in full while
those in dollars or sterling were not serviced at all. Cf. the judgment of the Swiss
Bundesgericht of 25 May 1936 … [Swiss federal court judgment in AB
Obligationsinteressenter, citation omitted]87
Although it purports to state the “customary function” and “decisive purpose” of pari passu, the
arbitral decision is anything but straightforward. The opinion starts by warning that the clause does
not guarantee absolute equality of outcome, but rather protects creditors from involuntary
subordination to new debt.88 But it goes on to reaffirm the broad objective of ratable payment in
financial distress: “the specific intention was to prevent the German Reich, in the event of
difficulties with interest payments or redemption, from making payment un-equally” (emphasis
added). In all, the majority of arbitrators seemed to suggest that pari passu generally meant
ranking, but with the goal of ratable payment in financial distress, when the debtor’s obligation to
pay is uncontested. Recall that in AB Obligationsinteressenter, it was Germany’s possible right of
reprisal that required the BIS to abstain; in the London Agreement arbitration, it was the exchange
rate protection mechanism that rendered pari passu inoperable. This seems to be at odds with
Argentina’s position in the NML case, where it argued that it did not breach the pari passu clause
because its legal obligation to the holdouts remained unchallenged throughout its lengthy period
of nonpayment, justified primarily by economic distress.

V.

Implications beyond NML v. Argentina

As this article goes to print, a new government in Argentina is on the verge of settling the case that
turned pari passu into a super-potent sovereign debt enforcement weapon. The judge who had
issued the injunctions has indicated that he would lift them to facilitate settlement, which would
deprive the remaining holdout creditors of their biggest bargaining chip.89 Nonetheless, for all but
the immediate protagonists in that case, the ending changes little. The ratable payment
interpretation of pari passu remains the law in in New York, as does the possibility of an injunction
Young Loan/London Agreement Arbitration, supra note 7 at 101. The opinion essentially tracked Germany’s
position, which “rejected the idea that the Young Loan’s pari passu clause was a means of creating fixed equality in
payments on the bonds, since the clause was limited to giving each tranche equal rank or priority only in the event
that Germany could not meet its full debt service for any reason.” Bathurst, supra note 84 (citing Germany’s
Rejoinder in the Young Loan/London Agreement Arbitration at paras. 144-151 (internal citations omitted)).
87
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Presumably this would happen before default. Cf. Declaration of Lord Peter Millett, K.G., P.C., in Red Pines LLC
et al. v. Republic of Argentina, Case No. 14-cv-09427 (TPG) (February 12, 2016) (emphasizing the same ex ante
early warning function of the clause). Buchheit and Pam, among others, correctly point out that such involuntary
subordination is impermissible in most jurisdictions today. Supra note 6.
89

NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20633 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2016).
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to enforce it. And although the courts are yet to rule on the meaning of the clause beyond the
Second Circuit in the United States, the collateral effects of New York proceedings include new
uncertainty about the meaning of pari passu in London, perhaps elsewhere.90 As it stands, the pari
passu saga can easily spring back to life in other sovereign debt crises; Ukraine and Venezuela
appear to be the most likely candidates at this writing.91
In such a revival, AB Obligationsinteressenter and its progeny could be invoked to bolster the
ratable payment interpretation, or at least testify to its plausibility. But should it be? On balance,
probably not, for four reasons.
First, inasmuch as interpretation still tries to give contract terms a meaning that the parties had
reason to know, AB Obligationsinteressenter seems beyond the pale. Attributing a 1936 Swiss
interpretation of a 1930 German bond to contemporary sovereigns and their creditors would
require some commonality of practice, context, or both. The legal, political, economic and
institutional context of sovereign borrowing has changed drastically since the 1930s. Restrictive
sovereign immunity has replaced absolute immunity, so that sovereigns can be sued directly in
foreign courts. The gold standard is gone. Revenue pledges are rare, as is the practice of giving
creditors control over revenue administration and putting countries in receivership.92 Governments
do not openly deputize the likes of J.P. Morgan to coordinate national syndicates in long-term
multi-currency bond offerings for friendly sovereigns. There is the International Monetary Fund
for stabilization loans, multilateral development banks for reconstruction and development
finance, and an elaborate infrastructure for bilateral foreign aid.
To be sure, some old practices persist, while many more have shaped modern finance, leaving
marks like the pari passu clause behind. Governments still lean on big banks to manage
international financial crises.93 Crises still bring discrimination between domestic and external
90

For example, Argentina and certain creditors holding its English-law bonds have submitted warring declarations
on the meaning of the clause in an attempt to convince U.S. judges of the likely interpretation of pari passu by an
English court. See Declaration of Lord Phillips, supra note 5 and Declaration of Lord Millett, supra note 88.
91

See, e.g., Anna Andrianova and Natasha Doff, Russia Sues Ukraine in London over $3 Billion Default, Bloomberg
Business (Feb. 17, 2016), at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-17/russia-files-suit-against-ukrainein-london-over-3-billion-debt; Robin Wigglesworth, Venezuela Risks Argentina-Style Legal Drama if It Defaults,
FIN. TIMES (January 22, 2016), http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/01/22/venezuela-risks-argentina-style-legal-drama-ifit-defaults/; Andres Schipani, Venezuelans add default to list of fears, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://next.ft.com/content/291433fe-cff2-11e5-831d-09f7778e7377.
92

It is worth pointing out that the dedicated revenue pledge in the Young Loan bonds turned out to be useless. When
Germany suspended foreign exchange transfers for the Young Loan bonds in June of 1934, the BIS found it
“impracticable to have recourse, for the fulfilment of the German Government’s obligations, to the collateral
security in the form of the railway tax which is constituted in reichsmarks and relates to only two-thirds of the
service of the Loan.” BIS Fifth Annual Report, April 1, 1934-March 31, 1935 (March 13, 1935) at 59.
93
See e.g., PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
AND HUMBLED THE IMF (2001, 2003), at 175-205 (recounting Group of Seven initiative to coordinate their banks to
maintain exposure to Korean banks).
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creditors, though not so much among external creditors of different nationalities.94 Nonetheless, it
would be a stretch to presume that creditors in 1990, 2000, or 2010 worried, or should have
worried, about the same things as creditors in 1930. For all the questions of fairness and
comparability prompted by contemporary holdouts’ demands for equal treatment between
restructured and unrestructured bonds,95 at a more basic level, such demands only make sense in a
world where the two kinds of bonds can trade side by side, without regard to their origins—not the
Young Loan world.
The function of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts probably changed several times
over the course of the 20th century, even as it retained much of the wording and a broad equitable
thrust.96 For example, it is unlikely that the pari passu clause in Article II of the Young Bond,
litigated in AB Obligationsinteressenter was meant primarily as an anti-earmarking device (a
purpose highlighted in the International Encyclopedia of Banking). Two other pari passu clauses
in the same bonds specifically addressed revenue pledges, while Article II was phrased in much
broader terms. Perhaps because the revenue pledges turned out to be useless when Germany
defaulted on the Young Loan, neither the courts nor the arbitrators mention earmarking or
collateral when they discuss pari passu. In contrast, the challenge of collective action among
Germany’s creditors, and fears of discrimination based on currency, nationality and bilateral trade
balances were at the forefront of everyone’s thinking at the time.97 With no high-profile court
battles to anchor its meaning and function at every turn, pari passu could have meant “no
earmarking” at one time, “pay everyone gold value” in 1936, and “pay everyone ratably, but only
if you have no valid legal defense” in 1980.
Diplomatic accounts and League Committee files suggest that by 1930, the phrase “pari passu”
had already become vernacular for somewhat elastic notions of inter-creditor equity. This general
meaning stayed with the term in the Young Loan through the arbitration decades later, but was
applied differently in a changed context. Absent evidence that modern-day drafters looked to a
94

See e.g., Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35
GEO. J. INT’L L. 795 (2004) (describing differential treatment among domestic and external creditors of the
sovereign in Argentina, Russia, and Turkey).
95

See Wright, supra note 21 (discussing the principle of differentiation in applying the pari passu clause).
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See GULATI AND SCOTT, supra note 6 at 111-138 (reporting different explanations for the origins of the pari passu
clause in sovereign bonds advanced by transactional lawyers).
97

The pari passu promise in Paragraph II of the Young Loan is what the Bank of England Financial Market Law
Committee (FMLC) has called “the internal limb” of the clause, whereby bonds in the same issue have equal
ranking among themselves. Bank of England, Financial Market Law Committee Report, Issue 79: Pari Passu
Clauses (2005) at 4, 21. The FMLC suggests that the internal limb might (though need not necessarily) imply
obligations beyond equal ranking, such as ratable payment. On the other hand, Swedish diplomats and financiers
used pari passu rhetoric to secure payment on the Krueger Loan, in parallel with the Young Loan. The internalexternal distinction becomes more muddled as one considers the web of transactions between Germany and its
various creditors at the time. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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particular historical meaning and function—be it 1843, 1871, or 1936—courts should seek
evidence of the parties’ intent closer to home.
Second, the Young Loan story adds to the oddly dismal record of the pari passu clause in sovereign
debt. It seems to have done very few creditors much good, from its first known appearance in
Mexico in 1843 through its starring role in Argentina since 2011, with the settlements in Peru and
Congo as possible exceptions. Time and again, sovereigns promise “equal footing,” only to
discriminate in distress. It does not appear that creditors use the pari passu covenant as an early
warning of distress, since sovereigns do not resort to formal subordination on the eve of default.
Nor have creditors been successful at stopping selective nonpayment. Sovereigns might well
discriminate even more without the clause, but different courts’ visible struggles with the meaning
and application of equality in sovereign debt should give judges and contract drafters pause.
Argentina illustrates. If the goal of its pari passu clause was ratable payment, it failed miserably
long before the latest controversy.98 The pari passu injunction was then supposed to promote
settlement. Instead, it dragged U.S. courts into a five-year standoff with a government that made
fighting U.S. courts a political cause at home and abroad, drew a stream of invective and prompted
a $28 billion default, affecting scores of market bystanders and ordinary Argentines.99 The court
and the departed government of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in Argentina found
themselves boxed in by their respective reputational commitments. It seems improbable that the
old government would have changed course had the injunction stayed in place longer, just as it is
implausible that a ruling against the BIS in AB Obligationsinteressenter would have made
Germany pay its creditors ratably. Unless the pari passu clause is to be viewed as a ratchet to
produce regime change (a big question best left for another day), it is not useful enough, and too
dangerous to keep in sovereign debt contracts.
Since the first successful use of pari passu as an enforcement device by Elliott Associates against
Peru in 2000, the academic debate has quietly conflated the meaning and the function of the
clause.100 The clause could not mean ratable payment because it simply could not work as ratable
payment where a sovereign debtor was involved, went the argument. AB Obligationsinteressenter
suggests that the ratable payment meaning is perfectly plausible; combined with NML v. Argentina,
it also suggests that specific enforcement can be both fruitless and damaging. For all its clunky
98

See e.g., Gelpern & Setser, supra note 94.

Announcing his intention to lift the pari passu injunctions, the U.S. Federal District Judge observed, “Vacating
the injunctions would serve the public interest by ceasing the collateral effects they have on third parties. The most
notable third parties affected by the injunctions are the exchange bondholders. But there are others, too: the financial
intermediaries that the Republic engages to help it pay the exchange bondholders; the FAA bondholders who favor
settlement but who are not parties to every single case; and the Argentine people generally.” See Indicative Ruling,
supra note 10. See also Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4 (arguing that injunctions in sovereign debt litigation
operate through third parties and backfire on the court).
99
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Cf. John V. Orth, A Gathering of Eagles, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 283 (2014).
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reasoning, the decision in AB Obligationsinteressenter only harmed the law of trusts in Europe.
NML v. Argentina harmed vastly more banks, bondholders, and ordinary citizens than it helped—
and backfired on the court by demonstrating its fecklessness. This is an argument against
overinvesting in construction. As one English court observed,
[T]he nature of the relief sought generally… is directed towards the coercion of third parties
rather than securing immediate compliance by the defendant. Because I regard this last
point as determinative, I regard it as unnecessary to attempt any analysis of the pari passu
clause.101
Meanwhile, pari passu will continue to challenge contract drafters. On several occasions, financial
industry working groups and academic experts have argued for removing the clause from
sovereign bonds, but have run into staunch resistance on the part of the creditors, whose response
is usually “keep it just in case.” The latest industry consensus model of the pari passu clause
narrows its meaning to ranking, and expressly excludes ratable payment102—which ensures that it
would never be used (governments do not subordinate when they can simply not pay). Yet market
insistence on retaining the clause in sovereign bonds should not be dismissed as mindless riskaversion or a symptom of agency problems. It channels perennial, acute, and ever-changing
concerns about inter-creditor equity in sovereign debt, which were justified in the 1930s and
remain justified today. However, drafters are yet to find a workable term to address equity in
general. Like the Young Loan, modern bond contracts contain multiple proxies for it.
Third, the time devoted to drafting and interpreting the phrase pari passu is better spent on
reconsidering the institution of trustee and the payment mechanics of sovereign bonds. Market
structures, such as stock exchanges, payment and clearing systems, have long filled the gaps left
by purely judicial enforcement and reputational sanctions in sovereign debt.103 By controlling
market access and fund transfers, they can exert meaningful pressure on immune sovereigns—and
are tempting to commandeer in the name of judicial enforcement. If payment and clearing utilities
are to be deployed to make sovereigns pay their debts, at a minimum, it should not be done ad hoc
for the benefit of individual creditors, but as part of a coherent framework to guide the courts and
101

Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, [2003] EWHC 2331, available at http://www.bailii.org/cgibin/

Leland Goss, NML v. Argentina: The Borrower, the Banker and the Lawyer—Contract Reform at a Snail’s Pace,
9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 287, 289-290 (2014) (describing proposals to eliminate the pari passu clause and the new
industry standard). ICMA Model Clause (English Law), August 29, 2014: “The Notes are the direct, unconditional
and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and rank and will rank pari passu, without preference among themselves,
with all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the Issuer, from time to time outstanding, provided, however, that
the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other
External Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same
time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa.”
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See e.g., Marc Flandreau, Sovereign states, bondholders committees, and the London Stock Exchange in the
nineteenth century (1827–68): new facts and old fictions, 29 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 668 (2013) (describing
the London Stock Exchange functioning as a gatekeeper for sovereigns seeking market access and a mechanism for
inducing collective action among creditors in the 19 th century).
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shield essential market infrastructure. Until then, payment and clearing systems should be immune
from injunctions whose sole purpose is individual debt collection, as in NML v. Argentina.104
Bond trustees stand between the sovereign debtor and the bondholders, and make an attractive
enforcement target—as illustrated in AB Obligationsinteressenter. However, as that case shows,
they are ill-equipped and poorly incentivized to represent bondholders. They are at once too
rigid—for example, lacking authority to engage in debt restructuring even when it would bolster
bondholders’ recovery—and too lax, too reluctant to sue defaulting debtors. This problem is not
unique to sovereign bonds,105 but it is made worse in sovereign bonds owing to a combination of
debtor immunity and the absence of bankruptcy. The League Committee and later scholars, notably
Borchard, commented on this problem in the middle of the 20th century.
Bond trustees’ unwillingness to pursue aggressive enforcement strategies has been the subject of
recent lawsuits involving Ecuador and Argentina. Sovereign bond contracts typically require at
least 25% of all bondholders to instruct the trustee to sue; they must also indemnify the trustee to
its satisfaction against litigation costs. From the debtor’s perspective, this makes trustees a nearimpermeable barrier to litigation—and useful as such. From the bondholder’s perspective, this
may make trustees useless. For their part, the courts in the 21st century appear to be as confused as
the courts in 1936 about the trustee’s functions.106 Specifying a more coherent and meaningful role
for trustees in coordinating sovereign debt restructuring in advance (presumably, in exchange for
substantial new compensation) seems in order.
Fourth, the fact that both AB Obligationsinteressenter and NML v. Argentina were followed by
policy interventions to reform sovereign debt contracts is significant. The League of Nations
considered contract and institutional reform in direct response to the Swiss case, advocating for a
new role and a new name for bond trustees, proposing model language on choice of law, and
dispute resolution terms in sovereign bonds.107 While NML v. Argentina was still being appealed
through the U.S. court system, a group of officials from wealthy and middle income countries,
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Belgium and Luxembourg have passed laws immunizing Euroclear and Clearstream. See Anna Gelpern,
Sovereign Damage Control (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., PB13-12, 2013), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb13-12.pdf; Lee Buchheit et al., Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Committee
on International Economic Policy and Reform, Brookings Institution (October 2013).
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Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1040 (2002), Steven Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Default and the Dilemma of the Indenture
Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037 (2008).
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At a hearing before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a lengthy exchange over the compensation
mechanism for the bond trustee (standard in the market at the time) came close to declaring the trustee to be an agent
of the Argentina, either in parallel with or instead of representing the bondholders. Transcript of Oral Argument, at
105-107, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105-CV(L) (Feb. 27, 2013).
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Supra note 73.
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together with the IMF and a leading market association, proposed new pari passu and creditor
collective action clauses designed to insulate sovereigns from NML-style enforcement in the
future. The modern-day reform effort has been remarkably successful, especially compared to the
limited impact of its interwar precursor.108
The broader lesson is not confined to reform substance or the fortunes of any particular initiative.
It is rather to point out that, at least by 2016, a shock involving sovereign debt contracts almost
inevitably invited concerted policy intervention in the contracting process—as did the European
crisis in 2010, Argentina’s default in 2001, the Mexican “Tequila” crisis in 1995, and the Third
World Debt Crisis in the 1980s. This phenomenon puts both contract drafters and the courts in an
implicit dialogue with international policy officials. Sovereign debt contracts come to operate in
the shadow of intervention. As a result, they might be properly seen as a product of three-way
negotiation among debtors, creditors, and the leading economic powers and international financial
institutions of the day.109 Faced with this reality, courts can either try to accommodate
policymakers, for example, seeking their input and deferring to it—or position themselves as a
check on or counterweight to the policy position. While in-depth consideration of policy
intervention in sovereign debt contracts must be left for another project, it is worth noting that in
AB Obligationsinteressenter, the courts went out of their way to protect the BIS and steer clear of
open conflict with governments, while in the later stages of NML v. Argentina, they consistently
rejected U.S. and other governments’ arguments.
.

Conclusions
Contract paleontology is addictive fun. It is easy to get carried away in the archives, especially
when one is looking for two magic words in Latin. When they pop up on the yellowed pages and
purple mimeos, the paleontologist’s heart skips a beat—maybe this time, the true meaning of pari
passu will be revealed. The story of the Swiss litigation over the German Young Loan in the 1930s
and its arbitral post script in the 1970s starts a new quest. But to what end?
The implications of the Swiss pari passu litigation for contract paleontology, and for contract
interpretation more broadly, could be more interesting than its application to NML v. Argentina.
As a viable field of study, paleontology needs a theory for giving voice to historical meanings of
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Weidemaier, et al. supra note 11 (reporting on the interwar contract reforms); Chanda DeLong and Nikita
Aggarwal, Strengthening the Contractual Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring—the IMF’s Perspective, 11
Cap. Markets L.J. 25 (2016) (reporting on recent changes in sovereign bond contracts in line with IMF and market
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Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Multilateral Negotiations for Rescheduling Developing Country Debt: A
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private contracts. The questions might be similar to those raised in the debates about distant
authorship and boilerplate, but made more complex by the extreme temporal gap between the life
of the contract fossil and its present use. What weight, if any, should we give to the original
drafters’ intent? And how do we know, in the global, decentralized sphere of financial contracting,
that any given drafter was the true progenitor of today’s clause?110 Should we search for the intent
of all the original contracting parties, or just those that cared enough to archive their most
persuasive thoughts? Should highly deliberate “off-label” adoption of an old clause change its
meaning? How to assess the relevant context? Is it necessary to trace the entire evolution of the
clause, or merely take two snapshots, then and now? What role for the Stone Age courts, Bronze
Age politicians, Neanderthal law scholars?
Finally, should sovereign contract fossils be treated differently? Then and now, sovereign debt
contracts are extraordinarily hard to enforce, politically fraught, and prone to extreme spillovers.
They live in the shadow of policy intervention, never quite as autonomous as the dealings of private
parties. Perhaps the Swiss courts chose political accommodation over analytical clarity in the
1930s. U.S. Federal courts professed to do the opposite in 2010s, when they took an ambiguous
clause to its logical limit, and issued injunctions to enforce it. Might paleontology help fashion a
more principled tradeoff? Or will it simply feed new origin myths that let today’s drafters and
courts off the hook in solving today’s problems?111
At least for now, extreme caution is in order while dealing with fossils. In some cases—as with
the pari passu clause—it might make sense to refrain from construing an obscure contract term
altogether, where all plausible interpretations yield empty or destructive outcomes, including for
the courts themselves. In sovereign debt, where the limits of court intervention are so palpable,
reform should instead focus on institutions that continuously shape governments’ participation in
the capital markets as a practical matter, such as trustees and payment systems. Meanwhile,
paleontologists and reformers alike must keep in mind the public and contingent character of
sovereign debt contracts. Even without statutory bankruptcy, sovereign debt crises never unfold
organically.
Policy intervention in crisis and official attempts to shape private contracts have been a feature of
the sovereign debt markets going back at least to the 1930s. Once upon a time, pari passu might
have meant ratable payment. Today, it means anything but ratable payment—until it morphs into
something else entirely, as yet unknown.
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Appendix I

Argentina’s Pari Passu Clause

Fiscal Agency Agreement dated as of October 19, 1994, between
the Republic of Argentina and Banker’s Trust Company
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Appendix II

Pari Passu and Related Terms in the
General Bond Instrument for
German Government International (Young)
5 ½% Loan 1930
June 10, 1930, at 112 L.N.T.S. 237.
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